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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 FEB 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ATTENTION:

STAT

SUBJECT: Outline and Concept for the Data Handling and Communications  
Implications for NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation  
(Task 9)

Reference: Your Memorandum; Subj: Report to the NFIB, 4 Jan 79  
(BYE-001-79/a).

1. On 20 December 1978, the Chairman, NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation, designated the undersigned as the Action Officer to consider the Data Handling and Communications Implications established in referenced memorandum. The undersigned was requested to form a working group with proper representation from NFIB to prepare an outline, concept, and scope notes to accomplish the assigned task.
2. A task group has been formed with representatives from SAFSS, CIA, NSA, State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, DCA, and OJCS. Members of the Task Group have been consulted and the outline and approach specified in the enclosure is recommended.
3. The enclosure is submitted for your consideration and approval. We will be pleased to answer any questions or respond to any comments you, or any member of the NFIB Working Group, may have.

Enclosure  
Outline & Concept for the  
Task Group on Data Handling  
& Communications Implication  
(Task 9), w/3 Attachments.

LEN T. BASIC  
Action Officer,  
Task Group on Data Handling  
and Communications Implications  
UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE & PHYSICAL  
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OUTLINE AND CONCEPT FOR DATA HANDLING AND COMMUNICATION  
IMPLICATION - NFIB WORKING GROUP ON COMPARTMENTATION  
WORK PROGRAM TASK 9

1. PURPOSE: To establish an outline and concept to determine the Data Handling and Communication Implications of the proposed APEX Special Access Control System.
2. OBJECTIVES:
  - a. To identify the impact in terms of costs, manpower, and disruption of service and other considerations the Intelligence Community would incur upon adoption of the proposed APEX Special Access Control System concerning Community computer operations and communications.
  - b. To identify, in situations where the impact cannot be specifically determined, reasonable estimates.
  - c. To analyze selected Intelligence Community collection systems and assess the Data Handling and Communication Implications of the APEX Special Access Control System on each portion of the Intelligence Cycle.
  - d. To estimate impacts which will be incurred by retrofitting current automated product or product derived data bases/files to conform to the proposed APEX Special Access Control System.

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e. To estimate the volume of intelligence information and intelligence data currently held in the compartments which, upon adoption of the APEX Special Access Control System, will require conversion to a Product Control System or release at standard classification levels.

3. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. Two major assumptions have been made:

(1) Due to the high degree of integration in the initial collection, processing, and production scheme, it is assumed that the basic collection and data handling systems will be afforded the same high degree of protection currently provided.

(2) It is further assumed that decompartmentation-sanitization will take place at the product reporting-finished intelligence production level. This is the point at which the APEX System will have a significant impact on existing telecommunications and computer processing systems.

b. Specific assumptions relative to existing telecommunications and computer systems:

(1) The BRAVO Control System will remain and be incorporated into the Operational Control System.

(2) The SOCOMM Telecommunication Network will not be significantly changed.

c. Draft Criteria and Guidelines developed by Task Groups 2, 3, 4, 5 will be available for review by Task Group 9 not later than 1 March 1979.

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d. Ongoing R&D projects concerning computer security and communications security will not be impacted by the proposed APEX System.

e. Task Group 4 will provide not later than 1 March 1979, estimates of the amount of material currently held in existing compartments that will be converted to the Product Control System or released at standard classification levels.

4. APPROACH: The Task Group recommends the following basic approach to assess the data handling and communications implication of the proposed APEX Special Access Control System.

a. Given the intelligence cycle (planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination), selected representatives of NFIB members will be requested to assess the data handling and communication implications of the proposed APEX System on each major step of the cycle for selected Community collection, processing, and production systems.

b. The chart in attachment 1 will be used to guide this effort. The left side of the chart depicts the Intelligence Cycle; the center portion represents a typical satellite collection system from the source (collection target) to the producer of intelligence information or product; the extreme right side of the chart shows the connecting communication and lists the primary Community Telecommunications Network.

c. The key portion of the chart is the actions that must occur at the block marked "Producer". The "Producer" has three major options to take on collected raw intelligence information. The information may be released at standard classification levels, placed into a Product Control System, or retained in the Operational Control System or in one or more Operational Sub-compartments.

d. It is recognized that the chart is a gross simplification of the process involved in an actual operation. The Work Group does believe, however, the chart provides a uniform and consistent methodology to examine the flow of raw intelligence information from the source through the Intelligence Cycle to the consumer.

e. Specifically, the approach could be characterized as a surgical-like dissection of selected Community collection and production systems. The System will be analyzed from point of collection to final product dissemination to the consumer. The total System, with all its computer applications and communications interface will be examined to determine the implication of the proposed APEX System.

f. This methodology, in conjunction with the chart, will be applied to Systems  KH-11,  and selected air (non-satellite), ground, and sea-based SIGINT collection systems.

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g. The chart in attachment 2 will be used by CIA and applied to a selected HUMINT system.



h. DIA and the Military Services will address the problem of retrofitting a large host computer system currently processing compartmented intelligence. The approach will be to identify costs related to re-design of current data bases/files, conversion/removal of data currently stored at existing compartmented levels, and volume of magnetic storage media that will require degaussing, reclassification, or removal from compartmented controls.

i. The approach outlined above will not examine every collection and production system currently operating in the Community; it will include all the primary Telecommunication Networks. The Work Group believes, however, that the systems selected are representative and that useful statistical estimates and projection can be made based on this approach.

5. TASKING: Detailed tasking on this approach is as follows:

a. CIA

(1) Using Attachment 1, develop the implications of the proposed APEX System for the KH-11 System.

(2) Using Attachment 2, develop the implications of the proposed APEX System for a selected HUMINT collection system.

(3) Select a host computer, with a large user population, and currently processing compartmented intelligence; determine and/or estimate in terms of cost, manpower, and disruption of service to implement the proposed APEX System:

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- (a) redesign of existing automated data bases/files.
- (b) conversion/removal of data currently stored at existing compartmented levels.
- (c) number of magnetic storage media (tapes, disks, drums, etc.) to be degaussed, destroyed, or reclassified.
- (d) identify any additional equipments or communications procurements necessary to implement the proposed APEX System.
- (e) identify any significant increase in computer or communications related manpower.

b. NSA:

(1) Using Attachment 1, develop the implications of the proposed APEX System for collection systems

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(2) Using Attachment 1, with necessary variations, develop the implications of the proposed APEX System on selected air (non-satellite), ground, and sea-based SIGINT collection systems.

(3) Same as CIA Task a.(3).

c. DIA, Army, Air Force: Same as CIA Task a.(3).

d. Navy:

(1) Using Attachment 1, develop the implications of the proposed APEX System

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(2) Same as CIA Task a.(3).

e. State: To be determined.

f. SAFSS: None anticipated.

NOTE: The above tasking has been discussed with members of the Work Group. Verbal instructions were issued to Work Group members on 31 January and 1 February 1979, to begin work on their assigned tasks.

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
6. TERMS OF REFERENCE: DCI Publication: Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions, 15 June 1978.

7. MILESTONES:

First Draft	1 March 1979
Final Draft	1 April 1979
Final Paper	1 May 1979


3 Attachments

1. Chart for Satellite Based Collection System.
2. Chart for HUMINT System.
3. Task Group 9 Members.



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Attachment 1



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Attachment 2

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Attachment 3